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"It is a curious circumstance that we grow poppy in our Indian 
territories to poison the people of China in return for a wholesome 
beverage which they prepare almost exclusively for us." 
       John Barrow, 18363 
 
"Thus far we have considered opium as an article of internal 
revenue.  We shall now view it as an article of foreign commerce. 
...aid of our China trade." 
 
Extract of court's letter to  
Bengal dated 27th March 17874   
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, tea and opium were 
inextricably linked through what was known as the China trade. As significant 
stimulant commodities on the global market, they were extremely profitable and 
also capable of introducing foreign cultural behaviour and social effect into their 
respective foreign markets. British traders, merchants and consumers regarded the 
                                               
1 I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their careful editing comments and suggestions. The 
Marist College SLA writing group patiently read many versions of this article and I appreciate their time 
and camaraderie. Special thanks to the BSWG group. Of course I am solely responsible for the final form 
of this article and the good advice that I might not have recognised. The research and writing time was 
provided by Marist College School of Liberal Arts funding. 
2 Kristin Bayer is an assistant professor at Marist College where she teaches in the history department. She 
is the sole Asianist and teaches Traditional and Modern Asia and China courses. She also teaches 
undergraduate classes in military history, consumption studies and the global drug trade, and women, 
gender and sexuality classes. She writes on nineteenth-century global capitalism and the opium trade in 
addition to foreign perceptions of China.  
3 This often-cited quote is attributed to John Barrow and appeared in The Quarterly Review, vol. LVI (April 
and July 1836): 518. 
4 Board of Control part I. Board's collections 1796–1858 opium F/4/59 1343 British Library, London, 
England.  
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exchange and circulation of commodities between Britain, British India and China 
not only as a means of accumulating objects and wealth, but also as a possible 
source of contagion—a vector for the spread of cultural and indeed, economic 
pathologies. In Britain, Chinese tea imports fueled an economic conflict which 
revealed concerns about how trade practices could potentially influence and alter 
national culture. An interesting correlative argument appeared in a Chinese 
debate which emphasised the importation and consumption of opium, as well as 
the British influence that accompanied opium smuggling from British India into 
China. The social effects of commodity exchange—thing both exported and 
imported—became a contested issue within the British-India-China trade and 
certainly still resonate in today's global economy. 
 
Keywords: China trade, tea, opium, nineteenth-century consumption, 
commodities 
 
 
In the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, tea and opium were 
inextricably linked through the China–India–Britain trade. As significant 
stimulant commodities on the global market, they were extremely profitable 
and also capable of introducing different social effects. British traders, 
merchants and consumers regarded the exchange and circulation of 
commodities between Britain and China not only as a means of accumulating 
objects and wealth, but also as a possible source of contagion—a vector for 
the spread of cultural and indeed, economic pathologies. The idea of 
"catching something" from foreign objects of consumption emphasised their 
dangerous irresistibleness: foreign trade could also stealthily introduce 
foreign ideas and even foreign behaviour.5 While tea was profitable and 
circulated as contemporary rhetoric argued it should in a healthy "free 
market," the British economy could have been crippled if the Chinese did not 
consume British goods and thus balance the trade. In Britain, Chinese tea 
imports fueled an economic conflict which revealed concerns about how 
trade practices could potentially influence and alter national culture. An 
interesting correlative argument appeared in a Chinese debate which 
emphasised the importation and consumption of opium, as well as the British 
influence that accompanied opium smuggling from British India into China. 
The social effects of commodity exchange—things both exported and 
imported—became a contested issue within the England-India-China trade 
                                               
5 Mackerras, C., Western Images of China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 29. 
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and certainly still resonate in today's global economy.6  The debates over the 
economic impact of foreign trade were veiled by the language of commodity 
affliction. In particular, British economic and political writers set out to 
balance out their trade position with China by critically analysing the role of 
Chinese tea in British society.  
The basis of trade contagion is grounded in ideas about consumption: 
namely, the notion that commodities carry with them more than their 
respective makeup, uses or even value.7 Tea and opium, both of which were 
significant global commodities that assumed even greater importance 
because of their inter-connections, together reveal a pattern of British and 
Chinese conceptions of commodity affliction. As Appadurai and others have 
established, commodities carry more than their "use value" but also spread 
elements of culture.8 Chinese tea, a much desired mild stimulant in England, 
generated domestic profit in both China and Britain, but also carried with it 
contagious foreign behaviours that prompted apprehension in some quarters 
because the Chinese were the "most effeminate people on the face of the 
whole earth" in contrast to the "wise, active and warlike" English.9 The 
development of such a characterisation coincided with expanding trade, 
theories of monopolies and worries over domestic consumption of foreign 
goods—especially before opium smuggling tipped the trade balance from 
China toward Britain. 
The complicated global nature of consumption in the nineteenth 
century can be elucidated by an analysis of the relationships between 
officials in each country and the commodities they traded and regulated. 
Influential political and mercantile figures in Britain and corresponding 
officials in China debated and manipulated the perceived link between tea 
and opium. While opium was often described as a stimulant that could ease 
                                               
6  Commonly referred to, and here also, as "The China Trade." 
7 As opposed to other theories of pollution and contagion in a different context, see for instance, Douglas, 
M., Purity and Danger (London: Routledge, 1984), among others. 
8 Appadurai, A., The Social Life of Things (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986); Marx, K., 
Capital (New York: International Publishers, 1992), 76 and various on commodity fetish; Pietz, W., "The 
Origin of Fetishism: A Contribution to the History of Theory" (PhD diss., University of Santa Cruz, 
1988), 11; Porter, D., "A Peculiar but Uninteresting Nation: China and the Discourse of Commerce in 
Eighteenth-Century England," Eighteenth-Century Studies 33, no. 2 (1999): 181–199;  Zheng, Y., "The 
Social Life of Opium in China, 1483–1999," Modern Asian Studies 37, no.1 (2003): 1–39 and Zheng, Y., 
The Social Life of Opium in China. 
9 Hanway,  J., A Journal of Eight Days Journey...to Which is Added, An Essay on Tea (London: Printed by 
H. Woodfall, 1756); Porter, "A Peculiar but Uninteresting Nation: China and the Discourse of Commerce 
in Eighteenth-Century England," 183; Kowaleski-Wallace, B., "Consuming Subjects," Studies in 
Eighteenth Century Culture 23 (1994): 131–45. 
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pain enough to allow for continued productivity in workers, used in different 
circumstances, it could diminish sensation and dull a potentially restive 
group of people. It was also described as an aphrodisiac and yet, "...both 
opium and heroin initially prolong male erection and postpone ejaculation, 
though in the later stages of addiction, desire decreases markedly."10  
Berridge states that the nineteenth century term "stimulant" referred to the 
euphoric effects of opium.11 Although the origins and act of consuming these 
items were clearly different, their major characteristics made it possible to 
pull them together and note the reflection between Britain and China: their 
economic value as two of the more important commodities of the time, their 
dual identity as stimulant commodities with contagion potential, and because 
British East India Company (BEIC) opium was being used to pay for 
Chinese tea.12   
Global trading partners not only wanted to balance out their trade 
relationships, they wanted to make sure that imported goods were not 
consumed in such great amounts that there were grave economic and social 
consequences. Governments and merchants wanted people to buy things, but 
they also did not want their respective populations to be so enamoured with 
foreign items that the consumption of those items changed the nature of the 
home population. If the English consumed too much Chinese tea, then would 
they start behaving like the Chinese? Could foreign-grown opium be 
damaging, rather than medicinally useful, to the Chinese? 
A series of pivotal moments marked the trade between China, Britain 
and British India; at each, Chinese tea from the BEIC-controlled India 
became the focus of serious political and popular attention. The first of these 
moments occurred with the commutation of the tea tax in 1784. By 1833 
when the BEIC was certainly focusing on the China tea trade, the 
characterisation of the BEIC's status as a monopoly was the subject of great 
debate and thus was promoted or contested by different groups of merchants 
and politicians in various publications that circulated widely in Britain.13 The 
                                               
10 Spence, J., "Opium Smoking in Ch'ing China," in Conflict and Control in Late Imperial China, ed. 
Wakeman Jr., F. and Grant, C., 144 fn4 (Berkeley: University of California Press 1975). 
11 Berridge, V., Opium and the People (London: Free Association Books, 1999), xxi. 
12 Martin, R. M., "Opium in China" pamphlet, 6, New York Public Library [NYPL]; McMahon, K., Fall of 
the God of Money (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 9; See also, Zheng, "The Social 
Life of Opium in China, 1483–1999"; Zheng, The Social Life of Opium in China (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005); Kowaleski-Wallace, E., Consuming Subjects: Women, Shopping, and Business 
in the Eighteenth Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 7. 
13 Greenberg, M., British Trade and the Opening of China 1800–42 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1951), 4. Also, Hoh-Cheung and Mui, L. M., "The Commutation Act and the Tea Trade in Britain, 
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second set of tea debates happened to occur at the same time that Chinese 
officials and the Daoguang emperor (r.1782–1852) began to articulate 
arguments regarding the perception of opium as a "problem." Yet, from the 
British standpoint, the China trade contained certain potentially useful 
features, including the promise of great profit for British merchants and 
correspondingly the possibility of increased British influence abroad. An 
expansion of the China trade could correct the issue of trade imbalance in 
China's favour (which would be worked out through the opium trade) and 
assured British dominance of the China coastal region. A negative effect, 
however, was the perception that China, through its commodities, could 
influence British lives. In China, the opium debates centred on ways to 
regain lost silver due to the trade imbalance and of finding ways to end 
smuggling. The additional Chinese critique of opium use among Chinese 
subjects emphasised the deterioration of social order that occurred when 
opium users were elite members of society and no longer able to represent a 
positive model for the rest of society.14 
In the late eighteenth century, the importation of Chinese tea to 
England, to the extent of creating a trade imbalance and silver deficit, 
complicated the British idea that the progress of a civilisation was linked to 
its circulation of money and trade.15 The prevalent idea was that increased 
circulation of goods and profit indicated healthy and progressive economic 
behaviour. Yet, with the addition of tea into the global trade market, trade 
that circulated out from England also circulated back, bringing more tea that 
was paid in British silver than the amount of items that left England in the 
first place. The profit itself was circulating because of this imbalance: British 
silver paid for Chinese tea, but British products were not being sold or at 
times even carried, to China. Instead of making profit from foreign 
consumers of English goods, local traders were making their profits from 
English consumers of tea. Tea certainly circulated and specific trading 
houses profited, but the government did not. What was missing was a 
corresponding British commodity that would circulate also. During this 
British economic problem of trade imbalance, arguments over the 
                                                                                                                                             
1784–1793," The Economic History Review 16, no. 2 (1963): 234–253. For earlier tea trade and tea and 
sugar meanings see Smith, W. D., "Complications of the Commonplace: Tea, Sugar, and Imperialism," 
Journal of Interdisciplinary History 23 (Autumn 1992): 259–278. 
14 Cheng, P-k. et al., The Search for Modern China: A Documentary Collection  (New York: W. W. Norton 
and Company, 1999), 111–119; McMahon, K., Fall of the God of Money, 37; Baumler, A., ed., Modern 
China and Opium: A Reader (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), 6–21. 
15 Extract of court's letter to Bengal dated 27 March 1787, Board of Control part I. Board's collections 
1796–1858 opium F/4/59 1343 British Library [BL], London, England. 
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consumption of commodities that were stimulants (coffee, tea, sugar—and 
on some level, opium) were spreading in Britain in the form of pamphlets, 
books and parliamentary debates.16  
On the British side, two representative participants serve as a lens for 
the broader economic and political economy debates over the tea trade's 
effects which raged in the mid-nineteenth century. John Crawfurd, former 
governor of Singapore and participant in a BEIC mission to Thailand, both 
condemned and supported the China trade in his writings.17 Robert 
Montgomery Martin, a journalist and editor who specialised in economic 
topics, spoke at meetings of the Court of Proprietors of the East India 
Company. Martin was later appointed Treasurer of Hong Kong (1844–45) 
and also presented expert testimony before select committees of Parliament. 
The Gloucester Chronicle said of Martin, "No living writer is so capable of 
doing justice to the vast subject of China as Mr. M. Martin."18 Both men 
were versions of "China watchers" who engaged with editors of and writers 
in prominent journals which, along with pamphlets and newspapers, carried 
the voices of differing opinions on the China Trade. Their writings reveal the 
extensive wariness over trade and consumption.19  
Both England and China were worried about trade contagion during 
the same time frame, but from opposite angles. The peak of this worry was in 
1833, just as the BEIC was about to lose its government charter. 
Coincidentally, this was a very good opium year for the British. Tea had 
become a fetish in Britain, stimulating a flurry of publications and even 
parliamentary debate. British concerns involved the importation of tea and 
the risk of Chinese influence that accompanied the tea trade.20 
Simultaneously, Chinese authorities discussed the role and meaning of 
                                               
16 Early tea debates cited in Porter, "A Peculiar but Uninteresting Nation: China and the Discourse of 
Commerce in Eighteenth-Century England"; Crawfurd, J. and Staunton, G., Remarks on the British 
Relations with China, and the Proposed Plans for Improving Them  (London: Edmund Lloyd; Simpkin, 
Marshall & Co., 1836). 
17 See British Parliamentary Papers: East India Affairs: China Correspondence. Letters to the Select 
Committee of Supracargoes at Canton in China, 7 June 1832 and Papers Relating to the Affairs of the 
East India Company 1831–32, both  Area Studies Series, British Parliamentary Papers, China 39 
(Ireland: Irish University Press, 1971). 
18 King, F. H. H. [and] Joynes, S., Survey our Empire! Robert Montgomery Martin… A Bio-bibliography. 
(Centre of Asian Studies. Bibliographies and Research Guides, No. 16. Hong Kong: University of Hong 
Kong, 1979), xv, xvi. and "Opinions of the Press" on the back page of Martin, R. M., China: Political, 
Commercial and Social; in an Official Report to Her Majesty's Government (London: James Madden, 
mdcccxlviii)  
19 Gilmartin, K., Print Politics: The Press and Radical Opposition in Early Nineteenth-century England 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 73. 
20  See Black, J., The English Press 1621–1861 (Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing, 2001). 
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foreign opium in Chinese society; the increases in foreign commerce, foreign 
pressure over trade and opium smuggling led the Daoguang emperor to 
request select officials' recommendations for addressing the opium problem 
in 1836.  
Historically, both Great Britain and China sought to control the social 
and economic effects of foreign imports. From the late-eighteenth century 
throughout the nineteenth, the economic and discursive practices surrounding 
the trade with China tied together tea, opium, Christian proselytising and 
notions of economic "progress." The China trade of this era sustained British 
tea demands and as this trade increased alongside increased consumption of 
tea, prompted debates over tea smuggling and the consequences of British 
subjects consuming Chinese commodities.21  The debates based in economic 
concerns reflect and constitute a range of anxieties about cultural, social and 
political "survival." At this time Britons turned a critical gaze to China, 
characterising Chinese men as effeminate, Chinese women as merely and 
only represented by bound feet, and the Chinese government as stubbornly 
opposed to the "free" trade so vigorously promoted by Great Britain.22   
Chinese opium consumption and its attendant host of associated social 
problems increased dramatically alongside British opium smuggling from the 
Indian colonies in order to pay for the domestic demand for Chinese tea. As a 
consequence, Chinese viewed the American and European traders in their 
ports as tainted by association with opium. British tea merchants and the 
opponents of BEIC used the increased role of tea consumption as a means of 
discussing everything from taxation and free trade to Chinese behavioural 
contagion. Tea merchants in particular invested in the trade debates because 
they not only wanted to procure tea from China easily but also from fear that 
the results of an end to the BEIC monopoly would impact prices and 
availability. In China, opium was more consistently discussed as a contagion 
that destroyed bodies, rather than as one that spread English manners.23 Thus 
tea and opium were the media through which each trading partner expressed 
their trade and imperial anxieties. 
By the early 1830s, the BEIC's government charter to control the 
China-to-Britain trade came up for debate and the tea trade once again 
became the focus of discussion. In Britain, the status of the BEIC's charter 
was debated widely in the press by a variety of people with interests in the 
                                               
21 On tea smuggling associated with the BEIC monopoly, see Mui, 234. 
22 See Greenberg et al. 
23 See opium debates in Spence and Baumler, as above. 
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China trade, British India and the BEIC. As a result of the Commutation Act 
of 1784, British tea consumption increased and British silver flowed into 
Chinese coffers, although that trend of silver importation into China was 
reversed by 1807.24  British consumption of Chinese tea steadily increased 
after the British government removed the BEIC's India trade monopoly in 
1813. At this point both the consumption of Chinese tea and Chinese—
although not yet British—trading practices had come under criticism in 
England.25 The Edinburgh Review was one journal that gave space and voice 
to the different arguments over tea imports and the role of the BEIC. Some 
contributors, such as John Crawfurd, used the growing Chinese exertion of 
control at Guangzhou along with anti-monopoly rhetoric to demand a freeing 
up of the trade.26  Robert Montgomery Martin, on the other hand, confronted 
the proposed idea of China as a limitless market and promoted the retention 
of the BEIC's monopoly over the China trade (although he argued that it was 
not actually a "true monopoly").27   
 By 1830, in The Chinese Monopoly Examined, John Crawfurd had 
revised his earlier and highly critical assessment of the Chinese.28 Crawfurd 
now argued that the BEIC monopoly had actually limited tea importation; 
hence an insufficient supply of tea, which had become a necessity, caused 
British suffering, poverty and alcohol consumption. His more pressing 
argument was that if parliament abolished the BEIC's exclusive tea trade, 
then consumption of tea in Great Britain would double. Therefore, greater 
access to tea would allow the British to increase profit by becoming carriers 
                                               
24 Downes, J., The Golden Ghetto: The American Commercial Community at Canton and the Shaping of 
American China Policy, 1784–1844 (Bethlehem, PA: Lehigh University Press, 1997), 108. 
25 Greenberg, British Trade and the Opening of China 1800–42, 3; Janin, H., The India-China Opium Trade 
in the Nineteenth Century. (North Carolina: McFarland & Co., 1999), 37; British Library, India office 
records: L/MAR Marine Records. President of the board of control, Charles Grant introduced into 
Parliament on June 13, 1833 the Whig's resolution abolishing the BEIC. 
26 See not only Crawfurd's articles, but also the British Parliamentary Papers: East India Affairs: China 
Correspondence. Letters to the Select Committee of Supracargoes at Canton in China, 7 June, 1832, and 
collected Papers Relating to the Affairs of the East India Company 1831–32,  both published by Irish 
University Press Area Studies Series, British Parliamentary Papers, China 39 (Ireland: Irish University 
Press, 1971).  
27 Crawfurd, J., Journal of an Embassy from ... India to ...Siam and CoChinChina (Bangkok: National 
Library, 1915);  Chinese Monopoly Examined (London: J. Ridgway, 1830); Matheson, J., The Present 
Position and Prospects of the British Trade with China: Together with an Outline of Some Leading 
Occurrences in its Past History (London : Smith, Elder and Co., 1836). And see Melancon, G., "Peaceful 
Intentions: the First British Trade Commission in China 1833–5," Historical Research 73 (February 
2000): 33–47. 
28 Crawfurd, J., History of the Indian Archipelago: Containing an Account of the Manners… (Edinburgh: A. 
Constable and Co., 1820) and Fetter, F. W., "The Authorship of Economic Articles in the Edinburgh 
Review, 1802-47," The Journal of Political Economy 61, no. 3 (June 1953): 249. 
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to different ports in Europe.29 In Crawfurd's view, a lack of tea was 
detrimental. The commodity and its otherwise ill effects were still a concern, 
but the greater problem was the misuse of the China trade which limited 
consumption and potential profit for British traders. Crawfurd also tried to 
present China as a potentially open market for all traders.30 In his previous 
writings, Crawfurd had argued that the BEIC prevented an expanded market 
for the tea trade. If more traders participated in the trade, then the price 
would be lower and with more tea they could sell more at ports. 
Contradictory logic is not unusual in Crawfurd's writing, although other work 
by writers such as Canning and Robert Grant complements his arguments. 
What Crawfurd does not mention directly however, is that the smuggling 
trade in opium was reducing the silver drain. He commended the Chinese for 
their long history and "best government and wisest laws of any in Asia,"31 
and yet when it comes to the illegal opium trade, "China has absurd rules, are 
in opposition to practices of other countries, cannot enforce their rules and 
their subjects defy, the trade is their consequence."32 Such a consequence is 
also a punishment for not conforming to British trade demands or maybe 
even revenge for the uneven nature of the tea trade. 
Crawfurd's change of position on the China trade (from excessive 
criticism to market potential) was subject to attack by his adversary, Robert 
Montgomery Martin, who directly answered Crawfurd's position on the 
China trade in his articles and treatises.33 Although Martin originally 
published the treatise anonymously, he specifically names Crawfurd in the 
text. His pamphlet also engages the then current and general debates over the 
BEIC's trade monopoly with China and compares Crawfurd's 1820 published 
article, wherein he criticises the Chinese, with his later 1830 argument in 
favour of China's trade practices. Martin argued that China did not welcome 
foreign (meaning Western) trade, in opposition to Crawfurd's revised 
assessment that the Chinese were "...intelligent, active, commercial people 
very fond of foreign trade and engaging extensively in it."34 These authors 
were clearly concerned with the economic effects of global trade but they 
                                               
29 Cited in Martin, the singular copy of Crawfurd's work is currently unavailable. 
30 Murray, H., Crawfurd, J. et. al., Historical and Descriptive Account of China (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 
Tweeddale Court; and London: Simpkin, Marshall, & Co., 1836). 
31 Crawfurd, Historical, 50. 
32 Crawfurd, Historical, 64. 
33 Martin, R. M., British Relations with the Chinese Empire (London: Parbury Allen and Co., 1832); Martin, 
R. M., Past and Present State of Tea Trade of England, Europe and America (London: Parbury Allen and 
Co., 1832); Analysis of Parliamentary Evidence on China Trade, 1832. 
34 Crawfurd, Historical, 50. 
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also used these debates to characterise the Chinese generally and Chinese 
trade practices specifically. 
In addition to citing Crawfurd's earlier work, Martin relied upon the 
accounts of the Macartney mission of 1793 and Lord Amherst's subsequent 
mission of 1816; Henry Ellis' contemporaneous account of the latter 
suggested that the Chinese were unwilling to engage in free trade and were 
furthermore inclined to an "unnatural tendency toward blockage and 
obstructionism."35 Martin also refers to C. Toogood Downing, a ship surgeon 
who in 1838 wrote one of the most referenced contemporary works on 
China, which was nonetheless criticised by both the English and the 
Americans residing in China at the time. Downing argued that the abolition 
of the BEIC monopoly would result in an "increase in opium smuggling, 
edicts against Christianity and the Christian response to import surgeon-
missionaries."36 The early nineteenth century Company men at port37 and 
their country trader counterparts, in the tradition of Lord Macartney, 
characterised the Chinese as having a "...commercial policy ... to prohibit, as 
much as possible, every species of manufactures and bullion... holding 
themselves aloof from Europeans, and particularly jealous of Great Britain... 
exacting [excessive] fees and port dues on each foreign vessel that enters 
Canton... imposing severe sea and inland customs and 
regulations...interdicting some branches of trade" and to further injustice,  
"...this is the nation which the industrious people of England have been so 
much cajoled about, when they have been assured  that China presents a 
mine of wealth..."38 Martin was making this argument within an effort to 
support the continuation of the BEIC's privileged trading position; as noted, 
he argued that the BEIC was not, in practice, a monopoly. Martin does not 
indicate who was making the assurances about the China market, but it could 
have been any or all of the following: country traders, board of directors of 
the BEIC or the British government. Thus, one point of debate was the 
possibility of limitless Chinese market potential. 
                                               
35 Ellis, H., Journal of the Proceedings of the Late Embassy to China (London: John Murray, 1817); Porter, 
"A Peculiar but Uninteresting Nation: China and the Discourse of Commerce in Eighteenth-Century 
England," 181. 
36 Downing, T., The Stranger in China; or, the Fan-Qui's Visit to the Celestial Empire, in 1836–7 
(Philadelphia: Lea & Blanchard, 1838), vi.  
37 An important distinction developed through the nineteenth century between the supercargoes at port and 
the board of directors back in England. Their different experiences greatly affected their impressions of 
trade abroad. See Loines, E., China Trade Post Bag of the Seth Low Family of Salem and New York 
1829–1873 (Manchester, Maine: Falmouth Publishing House, 1953). 
38  Martin, British Relations with the Chinese Empire, 16. 
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Martin's equation of "free trade" with a China market so huge as to 
make every private trader rich seems to have been an important component 
of the successful arguments which led to the rescinding of the BEIC 
monopoly on the China trade. Crucially, the BEIC President of the board of 
control, Charles Grant, supported Martin's critique of the trade situation. 
Grant's 1833 proposal to Parliament asserted that the BEIC did not exist as a 
monopoly precisely because of the increased trade activity of the "country 
traders," independent traders who used BEIC license to trade between India 
and China and were subject to all matters under the control of the BEIC.  
According to the position of the BEIC, the country traders could import 
opium and raw cotton and they could ship tea and silk to India, but they were 
strictly limited to the India-China trade. They could not trade directly with 
England.39  In addition, the country traders were the most active in the opium 
smuggling into Guangzhou. This problem of defining free trade and the 
definition of monopolies continued to haunt the China trade, although it had 
been addressed earlier by Martin in 1831, "I wish the American and English 
tea trade could be increased to ten times its present amount, and that the 
Chinese could be induced to take the manufactures of both nations in 
exchange for their tea—to admit the merchants of every country, whether 
single or incorporated, under less restrictive regulation—and to adopt (that 
which every man who desires the welfare of his species must ardently hope 
for) true principles of free trade, but which I fear, are as little understood in 
Europe as in China." [emphasis in text]40  for Martin, to allow China the sole 
profit from tea transactions would mean giving power over the British tea 
drinking public to the Chinese, a people who clearly neither understood how 
"free trade" was supposed to operate, nor were of the same character as the 
British, and therefore whose influence would damage the British people 
socially and economically.41 Martin touted progressive economic behaviour 
as the responsibility of any government: "[T]he idea that nations and humans 
in general should benefit from the circulation and exchange of goods, and 
that rulers had a moral duty to foster the flow of commodities and the 
increase of wealth."42 Thus, in Martin's view, the Chinese government's 
                                               
39 Morse, H. B., Gilds of China, With an Account of the Gild Merchant of Co-Hong or Canton (London, 
New York: Longmans, Green, 1909), 83. For more on these debates and the controversy over their 
significance see Melancon, "Peaceful Intentions: The First British Trade Commission in China 1833–5," 
38. 
40 Martin, British Relations with the Chinese Empire,  27.  
41 Kowaleski-Wallace, Consuming Subjects: Women, Shopping, and Business in the Eighteenth Century, 36. 
42 See Hevia, J., "The Scandal of Inequality: Koutou as Signifier," Positions 3, no. 1 (1995): 97–118; 
McMahon, Fall of the God of Money, 50. 
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disengagement from the global trade of imagined free circulation also meant 
that it was negligent to its subjects. 
The expanding tea trade of the eighteenth century and later concerns 
over the social effects of tea serves as a point from which both the trade in 
tea and the habits involved in tea consumption led to cultural fears which 
parallel later British criticisms of Chinese trade, opium use and the 
supposedly unmanly culture of China.43 The end of the eighteenth century 
saw a coming together of ideas about China that associated global trade 
expansion with progress while at the same time condemning the British tea 
trade from China because it resulted in British silver shortages. The tea trade 
arguments fed fears that the practice of "tea sipping" was an effeminate act 
sure to destroy British masculinity, undermine women's roles in society and 
ultimately reverse British trade dominance.44 Tea and opium did not merely 
inspire debate; nineteenth century imperialism and trade transformed the 
disputed logic of commerce, which sought to promote exchange, and tea and 
opium made the very nations benefiting from so-called free trade express 
concerns of being contaminated by it.  
The British were beginning to describe the Chinese population not as 
economically threatening and powerful, but rather as effeminate tea sippers 
who were also resistant to progressive ideas of trade, right when the debates 
over trade were leading to decisions regarding the role of the BEIC. Tea and 
perceived Chinese gendered behaviour and trading practices became one; the 
commodity was equal to the culture. Images of elite Chinese culture, the 
limitation of western trade to the port at Guangzhou and the lack of Chinese 
consumption of British goods provided proof of these characterisations. If 
the Chinese drank tea and were considered effeminate, as proposed by 
authors writing from London at the end of the eighteenth century, then the 
tea-drinking English would also become emasculated. The issue was not just 
cultural, but economic: the importation of tea into Britain and British 
consumption were not the only areas of concern; more importantly the 
Chinese sold their tea in expectation of payment in silver as opposed to 
balancing out the tea export with some British import. In Britain, this was a 
rejection of "free trade" but from the Chinese perspective these debates could 
alternatively reflect efforts to promote uncontrolled trade and a Chinese 
                                               
43 See Waley-Cohen, J., The Sextants of Beijing (New York: Norton, 1999), 128; Kowaleski-Wallace, 
Consuming Subjects: Women, Shopping, and Business in the Eighteenth Century, 24 and citing Hanway, 
32. 
44 Porter, "A Peculiar but Uninteresting Nation: China and the Discourse of Commerce in Eighteenth-
Century England," 183;  Kowaleski-Wallace, "Consuming Subjects."   
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reluctance to allow foreign trade to infiltrate society fully because of the 
potential for undesirable cultural practices.45 For the British, Chinese control 
over the tea trade would mean relinquishing influence over British 
consumers. If the Chinese were commercially backward, which is to say 
resistant to trade generally and opposed to British practices of "free trade" 
specifically, then the increased importation of tea could reverse British trade 
progress and rather than continuing to expand and hold privilege within the 
expansive world trade network, they would regress and as some argued, 
become "Chinese." In other words, the fetish is embodied by the linked 
social and economic impact of tea drinking in British eyes.  
 Porter's thorough examination of the eighteenth century British 
perception of China is useful and also covers the gendered element here. His 
argument is not concerned with the contradiction inherent in circulation 
arguments that promote the circulation of goods, but does not want that 
circulation to return home. The fearful voice of those concerned with 
emasculating Chinese commodities, stand in contrast to the subsequent 
1830s accusations toward the BEIC for suppressing the tea trade. 
Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that the concept of free trade is 
promoted from the point of view of those profiting from practices that put 
them at an advantage. 
This cultural debate over foreign trade items in the public sphere 
began in 1784 but re-emerged again in 1833 in reference to the 
complementary opium trade that would balance out the silver deficit. For 
both British and Chinese writers operating in relatively open forums, opium 
from British India was a frightening and strong stimulant that contained the 
potential to spread highly contagious behaviours—behaviours which were all 
the more damaging because the addictive potential of opium meant that its 
effects were less easily controlled and more likely to increase alongside need 
for the drug. In addition, opium was the solution to Britain's tea inspired 
trade imbalance and eventually the problem of China's silver drain.46   
The desire for, and fear of, foreign objects created a tension in the 
early China trade and had a dramatic effect on how Britain and China 
                                               
45 See Waley-Cohen, J., The Sextants of Beijing, 124–128. 
46 Despite recent scholarship that illuminates more fully the nuanced nature of the trade imbalance, at the 
time under consideration, opium was considered a panacea for England and the root of all problems for 
China. See Lin, M.-H., "Late Qing Perceptions of Native Opium," Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 64, 
no. 1 (June 2004): 117–44;  Bello states that the Qing government bureaucracy was convinced that the 
silver drain was from the opium trade. Bello, D., "Opium in Xinjiang and Beyond" in Opium Regimes: 
China, Britain and Japan, 1839–1952, ed. Brook, T. and Wakabayashi, B. T., 127 (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2000). 
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understood one another. While Chinese objects of the Chinoiserie era were 
desirable commodities that indicated fashion and status and taste, the 
physically consumed item of Chinese tea and the economic imbalance that 
resulted in British consumption of it, complicated the culture of consumption 
of foreign things.47 This tension allowed for objects to be conflated with 
perceptions about their origins: a commodity fetish. At the same time, the 
cloudy perception of trade behaviour—how countries actually traded goods, 
why they allowed in some things and refused other—had reached a certain 
peak within the nineteenth century China trade. The Chinese were very 
interested in technology and trade (especially the very lucrative early trade 
they were enjoying with Europeans) and yet, they wanted the controlled trade 
system in place at Guangzhou, referred to by Europeans as the Canton 
System to remain. The Canton System limited Western trade to the port of 
Guangzhou and operated through a system of Chinese Hong merchants who 
controlled trade activity, answered to the Chinese officials for foreign traders' 
behaviour, oversaw legal requirements and further reported to local officials. 
The British, in turn, wanted to continue importing Chinese teas. However, 
they also wanted to trade with the condition of parallel export of British 
goods to China. The so-called Chinese resistance to trade went against all 
that the British were seeking to attain, not only in an actual balance of trade 
but also as participants in the expanding capitalist economy. Without 
Chinese acceptance of British concepts of "free trade"—which were couched 
in the broader language of "progress"—British standing within the 
developing global economy was at risk. The complicated façade of equal 
trade demands created by trading partners belied actual increasing European 
and American interest in foreign goods. Nonetheless, the façade mattered: 
British desire for things foreign warranted a complementary deception of 
reciprocity if privilege within the trading community was to be maintained 
for either the Chinese or the British. This is to say that the rhetoric of free 
trade requires circulation of goods, including those from abroad, but does not 
allow room when a trading partner (China) does not buy things in equal 
measure. When the English desire for tea became great enough to put the 
English in a position of vulnerability, the English demonised the Chinese for 
not participating equally by consuming English goods. Therefore: desire and 
fear. 
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The tea trade had the effect of forcing Britain to re-consider its place 
in the global market. While tea consumption in England was increasing, 
China was not importing a significant amount of English goods. Hence 
China was acquiring more silver while England was "losing" it.  Because of 
the threat of the silver drain and both the foreign nature and stimulant 
properties of tea, the China trade was considered capable of "enslaving" a 
people.48As Martin stated in 1832 "A taste for the Chinese herb [tea] was 
created, and carefully fostered"49 indicating that tea consumption, as for 
opium use later, was introduced by China traders and further promoted and 
encouraged to the extent that it would become more than a luxury good for 
British consumption. As Crawfurd argued, tea ultimately would become a 
cultural necessity and a significant source of royal tax revenue. While 
American and Continental European tea consumption leveled off, English 
consumption increased, sending British traders (and the government) looking 
for ways to balance out the effects of imports that were not complemented by 
equally profitable exports.50 The threat of British "enslavement" by means of 
tea sipping, as I see it, was embodied by the Chinese product of tea which 
could both cripple the British economy and cripple British bodies—making 
them weak in a physical and economic sense.   
It is ironic how tea marked such destruction when it is opium that 
came to represent the depravity of the Chinese. As John Barrow's quote 
headlines this essay, "... it is a curious circumstance that we grow poppy in 
our Indian territories to poison the people of China in return for a wholesome 
beverage which they prepare almost exclusively for us."51 If the British saw 
tea imports and silver drain as a threat, then opium, in turn, could be used as 
a weapon or as revenge against the onslaught of tea. An American merchant 
articulating changes to resolve the opium crisis gave voice to the threat in 
this way, "…To make it the occasion of tendering to China, such guarantees 
as it is in the pleasure and power of Great Britain to give, against the farther 
extension of her colonial possessions...Let the rule be made final, that 
                                               
48 Martin, British Relations with the Chinese Empire, 8; see also Madancy, J., "Unearthing Popular Attitudes 
Toward the Opium Trade and Opium Suppression in Late Qing and Early Republican Fujian," Modern 
China 27, no. 4 (2001): 436–83; Madancy, J., The Troublesome Legacy of Commissioner Lin: The Opium 
Trade and Opium Suppression in Fujian Province, 1820s to 1920s (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia 
Center, 2003). 
49 Martin, British Relations with the Chinese Empire, 13. 
50 Ibid. 
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boasting, and recrimination, and threats of vengeance, and menaces of 
territorial occupation, ... be thrown aside..."52 Martin, though, like many 
others, argued that, "...the Chinese use opium as the British do wine or 
spirits, with perhaps less deleterious consequences to their health and less 
evil results to their morals." But also states, "Unlike many other articles its 
(tea) consumption is not sensibly increased by habit or time, the consumer of 
wine, spirits, ale, tobacco or opium will generally, according to his means, 
augment almost daily the quantity of the stimulant he uses;..."  53 Increased 
opium exports, it would thus be argued, could balance out both unequal trade 
and addictive behaviour—British dependence upon tea and Chinese 
dependence upon opium.  Furthermore, it could further function as a doubly 
revealing substance: opium represented the ability of a foreign power to 
penetrate and flood the China market which indicated inadequate Chinese 
economic policies, and British administered opium also revealed China's 
inability to prevent this foreign pressure. Chinese rule was thus implicated in 
the (self) destruction of Chinese bodies because of both its trade policies and 
its weakness in countering British pressure. Luckily for the British, tea was 
not as potent a destructive force as opium and did not have addictive, 
deteriorating effect either. To say nothing of the Chinese not pushing tea on 
the British public as opium was pushed upon China.  
The prevalent desire for objects and concomitant fear of them created 
a tension evidenced most clearly in the mid-eighteenth century British debate 
over tea consumption. This occurred at the same time that Chinese 
consumption of opium from British India was becoming more prevalent 
among the Chinese elite. As Zheng Yangwen has argued, opium was also 
being taken up by non-elites which aroused anxiety among Chinese 
officialdom.54 Mirroring the British tea debates, a concern over opium 
consumption across classes in China drew the attention of Chinese officials 
to the foreign trade port at Guangzhou. 
Aside from its negotiations with Central Asian rulers and Russia, the 
Chinese government had actively worked to limit and control foreign trade at 
its ports from the time of the Macartney embassy until the Opium Wars. 
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53 Martin, British Relations with the Chinese Empire, 14 and 22, respectively.  
54 See also DeForges, A., "Opium/Leisure/Shanghai Urban Economies of Consumption" in Opium Regimes: 
China, Britain, and Japan, 1839–1952, ed. Brook, T. and Wakabayashi, B. T. (Berkeley: University of 
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Waley-Cohen argues that the basis for limiting western foreigners to 
Guangzhou was not merely a resistance to foreign goods, but also involved 
promoting the image of a self-reliant empire and asserting control and power 
within China more broadly.55 As to European trade and mentioned above, 
Chinese governmental trade practices were embodied in the establishment of 
the Canton System. The strict control over non-regional port trade contrasted 
with the historical trade relationship between Qing Dynasty China (1644–
1911) and Central Asia, which was based on an unusually flexible approach 
toward negotiations over trade. There, trade agreements established familial 
ties through marriage exchange and created mutually beneficial tribute 
relationships while determining boundary treaties. Although there were 
differing approaches to overland trade and maritime trade, control over the 
amount and nature of foreign consumer goods entering China was still a 
concern for the Qing. In the late eighteenth century, Europeans dominated an 
increasingly global trade environment while Chinese success in maintaining 
its control over trading operations bristled against British demands for 
increased trading privileges, as embodied by Lord Macartney's visit to the 
Qianlong court, mentioned above. 
In Britain this conflicting approach to trade drew China itself into 
sharp, trade oriented focus. Underneath concerns over British tea 
consumption and Chinese infiltration lurked the effects of trade imbalances 
and disappointed ambitions in the China market. The focus on tea and the 
negative attributes of the Chinese also overshadowed the enthusiasm for 
"free trade" and the linkages between trade circulation and progress 
mentioned above. The contradiction between forcing free trade as a 
progressive effort and yet actually having to suffer its consequences by 
means of the tea trade was a tricky line to maintain. And yet, by demonising 
China itself, the contradiction was buried under negative rhetoric. 
In China, the beginning of the nineteenth century saw both greater 
trade activity and more foreigners in the port of Guangzhou. The country 
traders were increasingly eager to participate more directly in the China 
trade. They used the lucrative tea trade as a way to demand an end to the 
BEIC government-sanctioned trade monopoly. Their demands for equal 
access to the China market now brought British trading practices under 
criticism at home, which was reminiscent of the earlier tea trade and BEIC 
role debates during the era of the Commutation Act.  
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By the 1830s, as an echo of British attention to tea imports and due to 
both social and economic concerns, Chinese scholar officials engaged in the 
pressing debates of their time determined that opium represented what was 
wrong with China.56 Lin Zexu, most famous in the West for his pre-Opium 
War role in the destruction of foreign opium at Guangzhou, noted in 1835 
that the opium problem consisted of increased silver export along with 
increased opium consumption.57 This understanding was not merely an 
internal criticism of opium users because the opium problem was clearly 
linked to growing western trade along the southern coast58 and the potential 
for increased native opium farming to adversely affect the growth of 
necessity (non-cash) crops.59 Opium was as economically and socially 
damaging to China because it was being sold within the country as it was for 
its addictive properties. By 1836, during the governmental opium debates, 
Xu Naiji, Junior Minister of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices (1777–1839) 
characterised opium socially, symbolically and economically: "People do not 
fear the laws; they are more brazen because of their greed. Opium smokers 
are idle, lazy vagrants,..no useful purpose before them,..unworthy of regard, 
or even contempt."60 Xu Naiji concluded that, as prohibition had only 
increased social problems, a return to the earlier Qianlong Emperor's dictate 
was necessary. Thus what came in was taxed and could only be exchanged 
for goods not money when it went to the customs house. He also argued that 
sycee silver, a valuable bullion which was melted down from foreign dollars 
and mixed with some domestic silver was used by weight, to buy opium, 
should have been placed on the same footing as foreign money and thus 
should likewise be prohibited from export.61 Emphasising Confucian 
concepts of class morality, Xu reiterated the hierarchy mentioned above and 
called for officers, scholars and soldiers to be held to the highest standard. If 
caught using opium they should be immediately dismissed. Superiors caught 
                                               
56 McMahon considers the Chinese point of view to be that "the totalisation of emblemisation of opium as 
the cause of China's problems." McMahon, Fall of the God of Money, 37; and "... opium itself is 
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conniving in or otherwise covering up for or taking advantage of their 
subordinates should be brought before court. Generally, however, the people 
would not be sanctioned for their use of opium. For Xu, therefore, the 
solution to the opium problem was to completely remove the prohibitions 
rather than enforce them, even though he was aware of the social dangers 
caused by the opium trade and opium use.62 
Xu Naiji identifies two social problems caused by opium: merchants 
selling opium are greedy and hence not concerned with the rest of society. As 
unproductive members of society, merchants historically sat lower on the 
Confucian social scale in China. Secondly, opium smokers are unproductive 
and hence do not function as productive members of society. On the one 
hand, the negative influence of merchants can possibly increase through the 
opium trade and on the other hand, society will be damaged if social 
obligations are disregarded. Good men must behave as such for good 
behaviour to pass down, which cannot happen if merchants become 
excessively greedy and working people become idle.  Opium use per se is not 
the problem, but rather problems come from excessive opium use among 
people who carry an influence-based societal obligation; it was the officials 
in society who were to set the model for behaviour for everyone else. Hence, 
if they were using/abusing opium, their role of model would be overturned. 
The opium debates clearly reveal that the later stigma of opium—a 
marker of both trading backwardness, a commodity, and cultural 
backwardness in its drug form could be linked to earlier British concerns 
over foreign trade items, notably tea, that returned with trading ships to the 
shores of Britain. As a commodity, opium represented the way by which the 
Chinese lost control over import items due to their refusal to concede greater 
trading privileges to Europeans at Guangzhou. Later, on the global stage, 
opium became a symbol of China's "sad inability to reform itself so as to 
resist foreign aggression."63 In China, debates over opium imports included 
fears of foreign influence attached to the commodity but they do not reveal a 
fear of contagious British behaviour, or even signifiers of India, being 
attached to opium. Rather, the Qing debates over opium focused upon the 
economically detrimental effects of the opium trade and the "enslavement" of 
the Chinese by the trade.64 Indirectly, the fear of colonisation was articulated. 
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The potent combination of expanding borders and expanding foreign trade 
was increasingly evident during the mid nineteenth century as the trade at 
China's periphery drew global players from farther afield. The BEIC 
secretary, translator and missionary Robert Morrison noted that "[t]he reason 
assigned, unofficially, by the Chinese, for disallowing families at Canton, is 
an apprehension of colonization."65 Yet the Chinese were not the only ones 
wary of European encroachment into the region; a British embassy to Siam 
encountered ministers who perceived Britain's presence as indication of its 
goal to invade Siam.66    
The parallel between tea and opium thus was not merely about 
addictive, or destructive substances, nor only about managing British India 
through the opium trade or even the balance of trade for Britain because of 
the silver deficit. Rather, the relationship between the tea and opium trades 
pivots on the linkages among physical and economic health, conceptions of 
progress grounded in the circulation of trade and the way by which an 
established trading country could set out to avoid devolving into the type of 
trading country that China was perceived as being, i.e., backward and in need 
of force in order to modernise. 
As major commodities of the eighteenth and nineteenth century global 
trade, tea and opium represented more than items for consumption. Early 
British promoters of trade found Chinese tea to have potential damaging 
effects, while later debates over tea included its potential to expand British 
trade if its circulation did not stop with English consumers, but was extended 
to Europe. These tea debates seldom mentioned British smuggling of Indian 
opium to China which was offsetting the trade imbalance represented by tea. 
The image of China is the locus of the debates, femininity and economic 
stagnation serving as primary characteristics of the Chinese. In China, the 
opium debates reveal the ways that governmental officials conjured the 
Chinese population as representations of the opium problem, rather than 
focusing on the role of those importing it. The illegal opium trade could 
undermine Chinese authority and did create societal disruption through an 
increasingly addicted lower class but the Chinese did not reveal a fear of 
contracting British behavioural attributes. 
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The negative image of Chinese tea trade policy in Britain was 
subsequently linked to regressive Chinese behaviour generally, an 
unforgivable stigma which allowed room for the morally questionable opium 
trade to be established. According to discourses on progress, the Chinese 
were found lacking. The progress imbalance placed China and the Chinese 
not only on a different judgment plane but also detracted from a 
consideration of them as equals players in global trade. Hence to push opium 
upon a "lesser" people was not as troubling because it was their self-serving 
unfair trade policies in the first place that necessitated the opium trade. The 
influential American trader Robert Fortune found that the issue of opium 
proved a reversal from Fortune's other characterisations of the Chinese: "As 
buyers of foreign mud, as it was called, the Chinese are seen as a 
reprehensible lot that somehow justifies their exploitation as a market for 
European traders." Furthermore, opium smoking is the difference between 
the British and the Chinese: "the saved and the damned."67 
If tea, as a more mild stimulant was both useful in industrial Britain 
and threatening for its potential to subvert gender roles and make the English 
"Chinese-like," what then was the potential for opium exported to China?68 
While the debates over the effects of Chinese tea raged for a while in 
England, the effects of Chinese opium use were considered much more 
threatening. The British knew of the negative effects of opium use. The 
Chinese government felt that opium cravings and the subsequent increase in 
consumption to the point of otherwise bankrupting an individual was 
threatening to both society and empire. Certainly the opium behaviour of the 
Chinese was seen as degenerative. Just like the Chinese rhetoric of the threat 
of "spiritual pollution" and its effects from outside contact, the British 
corollary was the damaging effects of Chinese "peculiar" trade practices, tea 
drinking and opium use. The stimulant tea, first became threatening but 
opium was considered a much greater threat if ever the tide changed and 
opium use became something other than what the "Chinese did."  And yet, 
just as the fear of Chinese commodities riddled with tea and opium behaviour 
was articulated in England, British trade, from British India to Guangzhou, 
was promoted. 
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Comparisons and analogies were at the centre of the debates that drew 
China into the analysis. China was certainly fought over in one sense: the 
China trade was the potential key to the greater stakes involved. Successful 
trade control would allow Britain to maintain and expand control of India, 
but only if the trade was balanced toward British profits—in the form of 
either BEIC profit or that of country traders—as long as silver was not 
drained out of Britain. Trade superiority could not be accomplished if the 
imbalance continued, or if other factors emerged, such as serious competition 
from the Americans. In short, the competition over the China trade included 
the following issues of growing importance: national pride, if not 
nationalism, in the form of rivalry between Britain, the United States and 
China; the conflation of a national identification with that of progress—
"free" trade as progress; and finally the social divisions over drug circulation 
and drug use. The perception within China included the characterisation of 
all westerners at Guangzhou as being tied to the opium traffic, that the poor 
of China were addicts while the elites were merely users, and also that the 
Anglo (and others) determination that the Chinese were depraved because 
they did not pursue trade in the manner that the westerners wanted. The 
trade-culture link was hence lodged in early tea considerations and it 
blossomed amid nationally—based competition. Britain was teetering 
between either greater control in the growing world market or increased 
vulnerability because of its need for foreign goods. Nineteenth century 
attention to stimulant and addictive substances, which spanned Europe, 
China and America, all tied tea drinking and opium smoking together, 
implicating the Chinese doubly by being the so-called originators of both. 
While British critiques of Chinese trade practices have been linked to 
broader negative perceptions of the Chinese, I argue that the British wanted 
to have it both ways: to claim progress in the form of consumption and allow 
the circulation of items, including commodities such as opium that were 
socially and physically damaging. That is, as long as this operated in a one-
way manner and did not promote foreign commodities and behaviour at 
home. On the other hand, within this exclusive operation of "progress," 
British influence would convey goods and ideas to others. Hence, the 
circularity breaks down.  
